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Abstract 
We gave 40 participants a task in which they needed to select target objects from an 
array according to the instructions of either an informed director (who shared their 
perspective of the array) or an ignorant director (whose view of the array was 
restricted owing to barriers). Importantly, sometimes only one of the directors was 
visible, and on some trials when both directors were present participants were 
required to switch between perspectives. We found that participants were faster to 
select items from the informed director’s perspective than the ignorant director’s 
perspective, but that they slowed when there was a visible but inactive second 
director. Crucially, relative to non-switch trials where the same perspective was taken 
twice consecutively, participants exhibited a significant cost of switching between 
perspectives when returning to take their own perspective, but not when switching to 
the other point of view. We interpret these results as evidence that participants inhibit 
their more salient perspective in order to adopt another’s, and then incur an 
asymmetric switch cost as a result. This suggests that although we are egocentric by 
default, our egocentricity is effectively, albeit temporarily, eliminated if we have just 
adopted an alternative frame of reference.  
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Humans are commonly thought to be biased towards their own egocentric 
view of the world. We over-ascribe to others our own beliefs (Ross, Greene & House, 
1977), knowledge (Birch & Bloom, 2007), and visual perspective (Apperly, Carroll, 
Samson, Humphreys, Qureshi, & Moffitt, 2010; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004; 
Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). When we take visual perspectives, we experience more 
interference from our own viewpoint when taking another’s than the other way 
around (Ferguson, Apperly, & Cane, 2017; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, 
& Bodley–Scott, 2010). However, studies such as these and others (e.g. Tversky & 
Hard, 2009) also show that despite this apparent primacy of egocentrism, we can be 
sensitive enough to others’ visual perspectives to process them even when there is no 
overt reason to do so. Additionally, some researchers have found that we integrate 
multiple strands of information, such as what is visible to both parties or has already 
been mentioned in speech (i.e. in common ground), suggesting that the egocentrism is 
thus perhaps not so fundamental a characteristic of our perspective-taking behaviour 
(Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogsen, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011; 
Yoon & Brown-Schmidt, 2014). The present study was designed to inform this debate 
by testing the limits of our egocentricity with respect to visual perspective-taking. 
The Director Task (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar et al., 2003) 
has become one of the most common tests of perspective-taking in recent years 
(Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Dumontheil, Hillebrandt, Apperly, & 
Blakemore, 2012; Dumontheil, Küster, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Cane, 
Ferguson, & Apperly, 2017; Legg, Olivier, Samuel, Lurz, & Clayton, 2017). In the 
task, a participant is instructed to select and move items on a series of shelves (a 
‘grid’) which are placed between the participant and an ‘ignorant’ (in non-
computerized versions, typically a confederate) director. Due to a number of 
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occlusions in the grid, the ignorant director has a restricted view of the array of 
objects, and hence an instruction from the ignorant director to select an object in the 
grid is ambiguous if the instruction describes two items—one the ignorant director 
can see and one he cannot. Figure 1 (panel A) illustrates an example using an image 
from the present experiment, where the male avatar on the far side of the grid is the 
ignorant instructor. The image also includes an ‘informed’ director (female avatar) 
who shares the participant’s view of the array and hence allows for instructions to be 
given that do not require the participant to take an alternative perspective (e.g. 
Apperly et al., 2010). The ignorant director’s view therefore corresponds to the 
‘other’ perspective, and the informed director’s view corresponds to the self-
perspective. Depending on which director gives the instruction to select ‘the top 
clock’, the target is either the clock in the second row from the top (according to the 
ignorant director’s point of view) or the one in the top left corner (according to the 
informed director’s view). Across both ‘real-life’ and computerized versions of the 
Director Task, the typical finding is that participants make more errors and/or are 
slower when selecting targets from a perspective that is not their own, or when 
selecting a target for which there is a competitor in privileged ground (i.e. that only 
the participant can see). These outcomes are consistent with the view that the 
egocentric perspective is privileged (e.g. Apperly et al., 2010; Epley, Keysar, Van 
Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar et al., 2003; Legg et al., 2017; 
Samuel, Roehr-Brackin, & Roberson, 2016).  
But what are the limits of this apparent privilege? Is it possible to regulate 
egocentricity in visual perspective-taking? The questions we ask in the present study 
are i) do expectations regarding whether perspectives might need to be alternated 
modulate our egocentricity?; and ii) do we achieve such modulation by flexibly 
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inhibiting our egocentricity in real-time such that we may appear less egocentric, or 
cease to be egocentric at all, in the immediate moments after we have been required to 
ignore our own point of view?  
In order to test our first hypothesis, we compared performance on trials from 
the informed director when the ignorant instructor was visible versus when the 
informed director was alone. If participants are slower to take their own perspective in 
the presence of an ignorant director, then we will have obtained evidence that 
egocentricity can be modulated by expectations, specifically the expectation that the 
need to take the alternative viewpoint may be imminent. This is a particularly 
conservative means of testing our hypothesis because the participant could 
theoretically simply ignore the ignorant director on any given trial, as their 
perspective was irrelevant to the successful completion of the informed director’s 
instruction. To make this test more conservative still, we also did not tell participants 
that directors would sometimes be absent. Thus, we relied on the participants’ ability 
to perceive for themselves which directors were present or not. To ensure that 
participants were not simply adopting a more cautious approach when two directors 
were present than when there was only one, perhaps in anticipation of the need to 
switch, we also manipulated the presence or absence of the informed director. This 
would create a baseline measure of the simple interference effect of a second visible 
director.  
To test our second hypothesis, we also gave participants grids where both 
directors were on-screen and both also gave instructions. Importantly, each grid 
incorporated multiple instructions, and hence multiple trials. On ‘switching grids’ 
participants heard instructions from both directors at unpredictable times. If 
egocentricity can be temporarily inhibited to take a non-egocentric perspective, then 
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we should expect participants to find it harder to switch back to informed director’s 
(previously inhibited) perspective than switch to the ignorant director’s perspective. 
This is because we incur an asymmetric switch cost when returning to a more salient 
rather than less salient frame of reference; the former requires greater inhibition to 
overcome, and the subsequent lifting of this inhibition incurs a processing cost. For 
example, we are slower to switch back to speaking in our more salient first language 
after speaking in our second than vice-versa (Meuter & Allport, 1999). We are also 
slower to respond to a congruent trial on Stroop- and Simon-like tasks if it comes 
after an incongruent trial than after another congruent trial (e.g. Egner, 2007). We 
hypothesized that if the egocentric perspective takes primacy, then performance 
should be faster on non-switch trials from this perspective than from the ‘other’ 
perspective, but on switch trials this advantage should be reduced. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 We recruited 401 native-English-speaking participants (Mage = 21yrs, SD = 4, 
eight males, 31 females, one undisclosed/non-binary). Ethical approval was obtained 
from the University of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics committee. All 
participants gave informed consent before participating. 
Director Task 
                                                      
1 This figure conformed to a power analysis based on a pilot study that had revealed a 
significant difference between the presence or absence of an irrelevant director. The 
details of this pilot are available from the first author. 
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Each grid consisted of a 4 x 4 set of shelves with nine objects, three each of 
identical clocks, cups and vases (see Figures 1A-C). Participants heard three-word 
instructions (through headphones) all limited to the type: “The [top/bottom] 
[clock/cup/vase]”. One director (henceforth informed director) stood on the near side 
of the grid, and shared the participant’s (‘self’) perspective. Another director 
(henceforth ignorant director) stood on the other side of the grid (‘other’ perspective) 
and had a limited view of the objects owing to three occlusions. As a result of this 
limited view, the participants needed to pay attention to the perspective of the 
director. This was indexed by the gender of the director’s voice. For example, in the 
case of Figure 1 (panel A), the top cup, top clock or bottom vase would describe 
different targets depending on whom the instruction came from. Participants 
responded with mouse clicks on the chosen target. Director gender was fully 
counterbalanced between participants (i.e. for half the participants the ignorant 
director was always female).  
Different from other Director Tasks, grid types varied according to the number 
of directors who were present on screen (one or two) and the number of directors who 
actually gave verbal instructions for that grid. On ‘no-switching’ grids only one 
director gave instructions, but that director could be alone (one director condition) or 
accompanied (two director condition). When only one director was visible, the other 
was replaced by a lampstand in order to maintain a physical presence in that spot (see 
Figures 1B and 1C). On switching grids, both directors were visible, and crucially both 
gave instructions. This format resulted in ‘switch’ trials, where the director who gave 
the instruction could be different from the director who spoke on the previous trial, 
and non-switch trials, where the instruction came from the same director as the 
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previous trial. The results of switching and non-switching grids were analysed 
separately.  
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of the visual stimuli used in the experiment. A) two-director grid– 
this could be either a No-switching on Switching grid, depending on whether just one 
director gave instructions or both did on that grid; B) one-director grid (ignorant 
director only) C) one-director grid (informed director only). These stimuli depict 
examples with the ignorant director played by a male; half of the participants received 
a version with the ignorant director played by the female. 
 
A total of 216 trials were distributed over 42 grids of 4-6 trials with a fixed 
3500ms inter-trial interval. The grids and directors for that grid were presented on 
screen 5000ms prior to the first instruction. Experimental trials concerned those 
occasions where the instruction would refer to a different object if the non-target 
perspective was erroneously selected, and filler trials involved a target that would be 
the same regardless of perspective. Across the 28 no-switching grids, there were 18 
each of experimental and filler trials from each director (informed and ignorant) in 
each of the one-director and two-director conditions, making a total of 72 non-switch 
trials and 72 filler trials. Apart from the presence or absence of the second director, all 
the visual and audio stimuli were constant across the one-director and two-director 
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conditions. Crucially, each director was on screen for the same length of time across 
the task as a whole. 
There were also 36 experimental trials and a matched number of filler trials 
across the 14 switching grids. Half of the experimental trials were switch trials, so 
there were 9 non-switch and 9 switch trials from each director. These grids were 
interspersed among the non-switching grids, and ensured participants could not always 
maintain the perspective of the first director they heard on any given grid. To reinforce 
this, the practice grid that all participants performed prior to the task proper was also a 
switching condition grid. Participants only moved on the task proper once they 
performed this grid error-free. To avoid any potential order effects, we randomly 
generated two grid sequences and created two more by reversing the order of grids on 
them. Coupled with the counterbalancing of director gender, this meant that there were 
eight versions of the experiment, each performed by five participants. The layout of 
each grid array and full details of the sequencing of each version of the experiment are 
included in the supplemental materials (SOM1 and SOM2 respectively). 
Participants were told to take the perspective of the director who spoke into 
account when clicking on objects in the grid, and were told to respond as quickly and 
as accurately as possible. They were not told that a director would be replaced on 
some grids by a lampshade, or that only one director would give instructions on 
certain grids. The task took around 20 minutes to complete.  
 
Results 
No-switching grids 
 Accuracy. We first analysed those grids where only one director gave 
instructions, but another director may or may not have been present. By definition, all 
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trials on these grids were non-switch trials. A total of 34 experimental trial errors 
were time-outs (<1% experimental trials), and these were included as errors in the 
accuracy data, but were removed from the response time analyses. Responses made 
800ms or faster after trial onset (i.e. before noun onset) almost always occurred after a 
timeout trial, indicating that they were late responses to the previous trial, and these 
28 trials (< 1%) were removed entirely as a result. The remaining errors were clicks 
on other objects or areas of the screen. These were included in accuracy analyses as 
errors, but excluded from response time analyses. Mean accuracy was very high, and 
is listed in Table 1. The distribution of accuracy rates was not normal. Friedman’s 
two-way analyses of variance by ranks found no variation between accuracy on these 
four trial types (Z = 0.277, p = .964).  
 
Table 1. Accuracy (SD in parentheses) on no-switching grids (experimental trials). 
No-Switching grids Self  perspective Other perspective 
One director 97% (5%) 98% (4%) 
Two directors 97% (6%) 97% (5%) 
Switching grids Non-Switch Switch Non-Switch Switch 
Two directors 96% (6%) 93% (9%) 97% (11%) 93% (9%) 
 
 Response times. Mean response times were calculated from noun onset, 
which itself was calculated for each individual instruction/audio file. As the data were 
normally distributed in each cell (Shapiro-Wilks tests, all ps >.5), we proceeded with 
parametric tests. 
 We conducted a 2: Perspective (Self vs. Other) x 2: Presence (One Director vs. 
Two Directors) fully within-subjects ANOVA. The condition means are displayed in 
Figure 2. The analysis revealed a main effect of Presence (F(1,39) = 26.622, MSE = 
5093, p < .001, ηp2  = .406), with participants 58ms slower when both directors were 
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present than when only one was visible (SE = 11ms, 95% CI = [35,81]), and a main 
effect of Perspective (F(1,39) = 19.117, MSE = 16926, p = <.001, ηp2  = .329), with 
participants 90ms slower to take the other, ignorant director’s perspective (SE = 
21ms, 95% CI = [48,132]). There was no evidence of an interaction (F(1,39) = 0.133, 
MSE = 4781, p = .717, ηp2  = .003).  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean response times on No-switching grids. 
 
Switching grids 
 Accuracy. We next analysed the data for those 12 grids where both directors 
were present and each gave instructions. A total of 26 (<2%) experimental trial errors 
were time-outs, and responses made 800ms or faster after trial onset (i.e. before noun 
onset) were removed entirely (17 trials, <2%). Mean accuracy is displayed in Table 1. 
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Friedman’s two-way analyses of variance by ranks found significant variation in 
accuracy between the four trial types (Z = 15.732, p = .001), but follow-up pairwise 
comparisons applying the Bonferroni correction found no differences to be significant 
(adjusted ps > .09). 
 
 Response times. As the data were normally distributed in each cell (Shapiro-
Wilks tests, all ps >.3), we proceeded with parametric tests. 
 We conducted a 2: Perspective (Self vs. Other) x 2: Switch (Non-Switch vs. 
Switch) fully within-subjects ANOVA. The condition means are displayed in Figure 
3. The analysis revealed main effects of Perspective (F(1,39) = 24.611, MSE = 11770, 
p < .001, ηp2  = .387), with participants 85ms faster (SE = 17ms, 95% CI [50,120] to 
take the informed (self) than ignorant (other) director’s perspective, and also a main 
effect of Switch (F(1,39) = 31.510, MSE = 6951, p < .001, ηp2  = .447), with 
participants 74ms slower to respond on switch trials than non-switch trials (SE = 
13ms, 95% CI [47, 101]). Crucially, there was also a significant interaction (F(1,39) = 
35.917, MSE = 11003, p < .001, ηp2  = .479). We examined this interaction using 
follow-up post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni correction. On non-
switch trials, participants were 184ms faster from the informed director’s (self) 
perspective than from the ignorant director’s (other) perspective (SE = 23ms, 95% CI 
[137, 232], adjusted p < .001). On switch trials however, participants performed at 
similar speeds across both perspectives (MDiff = 14ms, SE = 24ms, 95% CI [-35, 64], 
adjusted p = .1). Additionally, on self-perspective trials participants were 173ms 
slower on switch than non-switch trials (SE = 21ms, 95% CI [130, 217], adjusted p < 
.001), but on trials from the ignorant director’s (other) perspective no such difference 
was found (MDiff = 25ms, SE = 21ms, 95% CI [-17, 68], adjusted p = .47). In sum, 
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switching back to the easier self-perspective incurred a cost roughly equivalent to the 
advantage of holding the self-perspective in the first place. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean response times on grids where both directors were active (switching 
grids). 
 
Discussion 
We explored whether i) participants’ egocentricity would be modulated by the 
mere presence of an ignorant director, and ii) whether participants showed evidence 
of inhibiting their own perspective in order to take another’s. The results pointed to 
four main findings. Firstly, participants were faster overall on trials from the self-
perspective than the other perspective. Secondly, participants were slower when 
switching perspectives than when holding them. The third finding concerned our first 
hypothesis; we found that participants were slower to respond when there were two 
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directors on screen than when there was only one. However, this cost was not 
restricted to the appearance of a redundant ignorant director, but was equally present 
when there was a redundant informed director, ruling out an account by which 
participants modulated their egocentricity specifically. The fourth finding concerned 
our second hypothesis; we found that the advantage conferred by taking one’s own 
egocentric perspective disappeared when switching perspectives. In other words, the 
primacy of egocentricity was eliminated on trials immediately following trials from 
the ignorant director. We discuss these four findings in turn. 
 Firstly, the finding that participants were faster to take the informed director’s 
perspective than the ignorant director’s when either was alone was entirely expected, 
fitting as it does the theory that we have an egocentric bias in visual perspective-
taking (e.g. Apperly et al., 2010; Epley et al., 2004; Keysar et al., 2003). We feel that 
there are at least three specific reasons for why participants were faster from the 
informed than the ignorant director’s perspective on one-director trials: i) The 
informed director’s perspective could be easier because it omits the need to process 
the more complex spatial structure that occlusions create; ii) the target of an 
instruction from the informed director was always the best perceptual match for the 
description (i.e., the top vase is factually the top vase; e.g., Hanna, Tanenhaus & 
Trueswell, 2003; see also Heller, Parisien & Stevenson, 2016); and iii) the informed 
director’s visual perspective is reinforced with the extra activation that comes from its 
being shared with the participants’. We do not prefer one of these potential accounts 
over another, and of course more than one may be involved at the same time. 
 Our second finding, namely that participants were slower on switch trials than 
non-switch trials, was also expected. Participants do typically perform more slowly 
when they are required to switch between visual perspectives within blocks of trials 
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(e.g. Ferguson et al., 2017; Samson et al., 2010; though see Samuel et al., 2016). 
Explanations that have been put forward for this include evidence from eye tracking 
data that participants conduct a broader visual search on switch trials, or possibly 
experience greater interference between self and other states (e.g. Ferguson et al., 
2017).  
 The same processes that make switching perspectives harder likely account for 
the slower response times when two directors are on screen than only one. 
Interestingly, we found that the size of this effect was similar regardless of whether it 
was the ignorant or the informed director that was visible but inactive on that grid. 
The present study therefore establishes that this interference effect occurs not only in 
the presence of a director who takes a different view from the participant’s, but even 
extends to a director who shares the participant’s egocentric perspective. Given that 
the informed director was in effect carrying a ‘redundant’ perspective because it was 
the participant’s own in any case, this result points strongly to an account by which 
the presence of a second director resulted in the expectation that a more taxing switch 
trial may be imminent. This creates a rather unusual ‘egocentric’ interference effect 
caused not by one’s own knowledge, but by an avatar who shares it. This has 
important ramifications for perspective-taking research that uses proxies such as 
avatars to represent self-perspective trials in a task; it appears that it cannot be taken 
for granted that just because an avatar and participant share a perspective that the 
participant performs the same with or without the proxy. 
 Our most interesting finding was that the advantage of the self-perspective on 
non-switch trials disappeared on switch trials. This was driven by a statistically 
significant slowdown on switch trials to the informed director. Switching to the 
ignorant director did not cause any such slowdown. This pattern of results appears to 
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be consistent with the suggestion that the egocentric perspective was the more salient 
by default, and hence required a disproportionate degree of inhibition relative to the 
other perspective, a finding that is in turn consistent with the evidence from other 
tasks that report so-called asymmetrical switch costs that we described earlier (e.g. 
Egner, 2007; Meuter & Allport, 1999; see Koch, Gade, Shuch, & Philipp, 2010, for a 
discussion of potential mechanisms underpinning asymmetric switch costs). It is also 
consistent with the broader view that domain-general, top-down processes can 
modulate our ability to take non-egocentric perspectives (e.g. Brown-Schmidt, 2009; 
Cane et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2010). For example, Lin et al. (2010) found that 
participants with greater working memory resources needed less time between first 
fixating and then selecting targets in a Director Task, and Cane et al. found that 
rewarding participants led them to make greater use of perspective information (i.e. 
what was in privileged or common ground). In the original computerized version of 
the Director Task, Apperly and colleagues (2010) also suggested that general 
executive processes were implicated in the ability to successfully take the ignorant 
director’s perspective. However, studies also exist that suggest top-down processes do 
not influence our ability to take perspective (e.g. Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Ryskin, 
Brown-Schmidt, Canseco-Gonzalez, Yiu, & Nguyen, 2014). It may be that more 
local, task-based factors influence any relationship, such as whether we take the 
perspective of a person or an avatar (see for example Skaratt, Cole, & Kuhn, 2012). 
Our finding also seems to contradict that of Bradford, Welsh, and Gomez (2015), who 
reported an asymmetric switch cost favouring more efficient switches to the self-
perspective. This inconsistency might be explained by differences in task aims and 
design. For example, in Bradford and colleagues’ study the other person was 
introduced suddenly at the moment of the switch and not before, which may have 
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increased processing demands relative to switches to the other perspective in our 
study, and relative to switches to a self perspective (which is instead present 
throughout by default). Perhaps more importantly, our study was concerned with 
testing visual perspective-taking, whereas Bradford et al. were investigating belief 
attributions. It may be that different processes are engaged in switching between 
visual perspectives and switching between belief states. 
 Overall, however, we feel that the results of this study appear not to offer 
unqualified support to one theory of perspective-taking or another. On the one hand, 
the results appear to favour the view that the egocentric perspective is the most salient 
by default, firstly because trials from this perspective were performed more quickly, 
and secondly because we do not see a switch cost on trials from the ignorant director. 
However, it is also clear that this egocentricity is flexible; it can be temporarily 
eliminated by the mere act of taking the ‘other’ frame of reference as our starting 
point and then having to adjust back to our own. In this sense, our results might also 
be viewed as supporting accounts that posit a less pivotal role of egocentrism in such 
tasks (e.g. Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011). Important questions for future research 
thus concern at what point the balance of perspective salience might tip in favour of 
another’s viewpoint for a more sustained period; how many times do we need to take 
another person’s perspective before we are required instead to suppress that 
perspective? How quickly might such a reversal of salience take to decay? And given 
the fluid and efficient perspective-taking in linguistic interaction (Brown-Schmidt & 
Hanna, 2011), is egocentricity more flexible in language-based tasks?  
 In sum, we found that although we are believed to be inherently egocentric, 
taking an alternative point of view is enough to temporarily suspend the salience of 
our own perspective. As such, the primacy of our egocentricity may be more flexible, 
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or fragile, than we think. 
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